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Judicial Enforcement of the Right to an
Equal Education in Illinois
MICHAEL P. SENG
MICHAEL R. BOODEN*
A major factor in assuring the future success of the American
Experiment is the quality of our system of public education.

In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme

Court recognized that:

[e]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state

and local governments ....
It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities. . . . It is the very
foundation of good citizenship ....
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in

life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.'
Despite this declaration on the importance of education, the United
States Supreme Court has generally backed away from playing a
significant role in insuring that this right is available to all on equal
2
terms.
Also, despite the fact that we now have a cabinet-level Department of Education and a president who once proclaimed that he
wanted to be known as "The Education President," no federal policy

* Michael P. Seng is a professor at The John Marshall Law School in
Chicago. Michael Booden is an associate attorney at the Chicago law firm of Pitler
and Mandell. The authors would like to thank David McLenachen, a student at The
John Marshall Law School, for his valuable research assistance. They would also like
to thank Professor Ann Lousin of The John Marshall Law School for her valuable
insights on Illinois constitutional law. The views expressed in this article are soley
those of the authors.
1. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Constitution
forbids only "purposeful" discrimination); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the Texas system of financing education through
local property taxes did not violate equal protection); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (upholding a school practice of charging a fee for school
bus service). See generally supra part I.
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insuring all students an equal education has been implemented.' Such
a policy would require long-term planning and implementation, but
the short-term political benefits of such a policy presumably do not
balance the tough choices required. Hence, we can probably expect
no more than lip-service about this problem from the federal government at this time especially given the federal budget deficit.
Illinois politicians have also failed to rise to the challenge. Despite
the occasional passage of "reform" legislation, 4 the Illinois legislature
has failed to address meaningfully the problem of inequality in the
Illinois educational system.
In May of 1990, the Illinois Board of Education issued its 1989
"School Report Card." 5 This report affirmed the findings of scholars
who had contended for many years that disparities in per-pupil
funding of public schools produced greater and greater inequities in
the quality of education provided to students in Illinois. 6 The report
broke new ground by providing evidence of the direct relationship
between the amount of per-pupil funding and student test scores. The
3. In April 1991, President Bush introduced his proposal to revive the American educational system. The program does not focus specifically on the inequalities
of our present educational system. The program seeks to promote freedom of choice
for students among public and private schools and encourage the setting of skills
standards and the monitoring of student progress. It also focuses on the training and
certification of teachers. Missing from the program is any massive increase in funding
for education. The program proposes the development of 435 new schools by local
communities. Congress is asked to provide a one-time one million dollar grant to
each school and money will be sought from private donors to fund research to study
new types of education and teaching. See Susan Chira, Bush School Plan Would
Encourage Choice by Parents, N. Y. TIMES, April 19, 1991, at 1, Col. 5.
The same week that President Bush made his proposal it was disclosed that the
Chicago Public School system faced a $300 million shortfall in its next year's budget.
Karen Thomas, Cuts Loom for Chicago Schools, CH. TRIB., April 21, 1991, at 1,
Col. 3.
4. The legislature has wrestled over the formula to be used by local school
districts to compute state aid. Act of Aug. 1, 1985, P.A. 84-126, 1985 ILL. LAWS
1351; P. A. 78-215, effective March 1, 1973; Act of July 18, 1973, P.A. 78-126, 1973
ILL. LAWS 638 (proposing alternative method of computing state funding and reimbursements to school districts).
5. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, PerformanceProfiles: Illinois Schools
Report to the Public, School Report Card of 1989 (1990) [hereinafter School Report
Card].
6. See generally G. A. HICKROD, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM IN ILLINOIS, A STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE: 1973 TO 1986
(Normal, IL: Center for the Study of Educational Finance, Illinois State University,
1986); J. Ward, In Pursuit of Equity and Adequacy: Reforming School Finance in
Illinois, J. EDUC. FIN. 12, 107-20 (1987).

1991:45]

EQUAL ED UCA TION

report concluded that students who attended school in districts which
had larger per-pupil funds available had much higher achievement
scores in mathematics and reading and higher ACT test scores than
students in districts with fewer per-pupil funds available. 7
On November 13, 1990, the Committee for Educational Rights,
a group of 47 Illinois school districts, parents and students, filed suit
in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment
that the statutory scheme of financing elementary and high schools in

7. Ward, supra n. 6, at 12-13. School districts in the top quarter of the scale
as measured by the equalized assessed valuation per pupil (EAVPP) were defined as
"rich" districts, while districts placed in the bottom quarter of the distribution were

defined as "poor" districts. On average, local sources of revenue provide the largest
proportion of Illinois school district revenues (54%) compared to revenues from state
(38%) and federal (8%) sources. Id. at 11. There were vast differences in reading
scores, mathematical scores, and composite scores between "rich" districts and
"poor" districts. Id. at vi.
The average IGAP (Illinois Goal Assessment Program) reading scores at Grade
3 were 292 in rich districts and 259 in poor districts; Grade 6, 282 in rich districts
and 248 in poor districts; and Grade 8, 285 in rich districts and 252 in poor districts.
The difference in favor of students in rich digtricts was at least 33 points at each
grade level. (The IGAP reading scale score has a 1-500 range). Id. at vi.
The average mathematics scores at Grade 3 were 294 in rich districts and 246 in
poor districts; Grade 6, 294 in rich districts and 247 in poor districts; and Grade 8,
291 in rich districts and 242 in poor districts. The difference in favor of students in
rich districts was at least 47 points at each grade level. (The IGAP mathematics score
scale has a 1-800 range). Id.
The average ACT composite score was 19.9 for rich districts and 18.2 for poor
districts, a difference of 1.7. The average English score was 19.3 for rich districts
compared to 18.1 for poor districts, a difference of 1.2 points; the average mathematics score was 191 for rich districts and 16.4 for poor districts, a difference of
2.7 points. (ACT scores run from 1 to a maximum of 36). Id.
The report also revealed that poor districts with significantly higher proportions
of students from low-income families had considerably fewer resources to help educate
their students. Id. at vii. Finally, more money was spent to educate students in rich
districts than in poor districts. At the elementary level, the operating expenditure per
pupil was 31% higher in rich districts than in poor districts and at the high school
level, 68% higher in rich districts than in poor districts. Id.
In the 1988-89 school year, eight school districts spent more than $8,000 per
pupil, while 100 districts spent less than $2,804 per pupil. Id. at vi. The average
operating expenditure per pupil for the State in 1988 was $4,215. The source of these
disparities in funding is due in great part to low property values in poor districts.
The report revealed that in 1988 rich districts' real property values per student were
nearly six times that of poor districts at the elementary level and more than eight
times that of poor districts at the high school level ($159,000 compared to $28,000
at the elementary level; $222,000 compared to $26,000 at the high school level). Id.
at vii.
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Illinois violated the 1970 Illinois Constitution. 8 The suit alleged that
the statutory scheme violated three provisions of the Illinois Constitution:
(1) Article Ten section one ("Education Article"). The Education Article requires the State to provide "an efficient
system of high quality public educational institutions and
services;"
(2) Article one, section two (the "Equal Protection Clause").
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no person
shall be denied equal protection of the law;
(3) Article four, section thirteen ("No-Special-Law Article").
The No-Special-Law Article provides that the General
Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general
law is or can be made applicable. 9
The suit asserted that the statutory scheme violated the education
article because it failed to provide an adequate minimum education
and therefore failed to establish "an efficient system of high quality
public education for every child in Illinois public schools." 10° The suit
also alleged that the statutory scheme violated the equal protection
clause and the no-special-law article because the distribution scheme
imposed "unnecessary burdens upon the 'constitutionally suspect'
class of children living in school districts with relatively lower property
wealth and upon their fundamental right of education."'"
8. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Thompson, No. 90 Ch. 1097 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, Filed Nov. 13, 1990).
9. Id. at para. 2.
10. Id. at para. 5.
11. Id. at para. 4. The suit highlighted the State's responsibility for the alleged
disparities of funding, as a result of the reliance of school districts on local property
taxes, by pointing out that the taxing power rests with the State pursuant to Article
IX, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution, and that without this authority, local school
boards would have no power to create a tax base. Id. at para. 89. The suit further
alleged that the General State Aid formula, relied upon to eliminate the gap in
funding between property tax revenues raised by rich and poor school districts, is
only successful in effectively equalizing poor districts with other poor districts, but
that it does not effectively equalize the resources available to rich and poor districts.
Id. at para. 103. Relying on data gathered from the 1986-87 school year, the suit
alleged that even after the revenues supplied by General State Aid are added to local
revenues,*a 63% gap still existed between the revenues available to the richest 10%
of elementary schools and the poorest 10% of elementary schools. Id. at para. 107.
This suit arises out of a movement over two decades old which has centered on
the quest to achieve equity in expenditures per pupil in Illinois schools. See J. Ward,
In Pursuit of Equity and Adequacy: Reforming School Finance in Illinois, J. EDUC.

EQUAL EDUCATION
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This paper will go beyond the immediate concern of whether the
Illinois Constitution requires equality of funding. The right to an
equal education also concerns the right of various minority students,
including those who are mentally, physically and socially disabled and
those who are non-English-speaking, to secure an appropriate education. We will therefore examine the fundamental questions of what
the right to an education really means and the nature of equality
protected by Illinois law. We will see that federal law does not provide
any ready answers to these questions. Therefore, we will analyze the
education article in the Illinois Constitution and the Illinois equal
protection clause. Finally and most fundamentally, we will examine
the nature and the role of the Illinois courts and the distinction in
Illinois between questions that are purely "political" and those that
are justiciable.
While the immediate focus of this article is on the right to an
equal education in Illinois, we see this article as serving a broader
purpose. In this day and age when the federal courts are disclaiming
their responsibility for protecting our basic liberties, the question
remains whether the Illinois courts will erect the bulwarks necessary
to protect persons in Illinois from the basic inequalities that affect
their opportunity to participate in public life.
I.

THE RIGHT

To AN EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION

In Brown v. Board of Education,'2 the United States Supreme
Court held, in a unanimous decision, that under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states may no longer segregate
public schools on the basis of race. In "overruling" Plessy v. Ferguson, 3 the Court considered "public education in the light of its full
FIN. 12 (Summer 1987) 107-220 [hereinafter Ward]; G. A. Hickrod, et al. The Long
March to Educational Inequality in Illinois: FinancialFactsfor the Committee Versus
Edgar, Center for the Study of Educational Finance, Illinois State University, March
1991 (Advance Copy) [hereinafter Hickrod]. While the enactment of the state income
tax in 1969 and broad reform of the school finance system by the legislature in 1973
increased equity in school spending throughout the State, the last decade has seen
the inequities grow as a result, in part, of a drop of 380 in the State's share of
funding. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Thompson, No. 90 Ch. 1097 at para. 145
(Cir. Ct. Cook County, Filed Nov. 13, 1990). See generally, Ward, supra;.Hickrod,
supra.
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Although the Court in Brown did not explicitly
overrule Plessy, the Court expressly repudiated the "separate, but equal" doctrine
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development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation."1 4 However, despite the Court's recognition of the importance
of education in Brown, the Court has backed away from its support
of the constitutional right to an equal education in such decisions as
5
San Antonio v. Rodriguez' and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools. 16
A.

SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ

In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 7 the plaintiffs, Mexican-American
parents of children attending elementary and secondary schools in a
school district with a low property tax base,'" contended that the
Texas system of financing public education, with its heavy reliance
on local property taxes, 9 violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. The plaintiffs based their contention on
the substantial disparity in the amount of funds available, on a perpupil basis, between school districts like theirs and other propertyrich school districts. This disparity resulted in underfunded physical
facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes, and a narrower
which was adopted by the Court in Plessy, at least to the extent to which it applied
in the context of public education. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The impact of Brown,
however, extended far beyond the institution of public education because the Court,
soon after, found that segregation on the basis of race was unconstitutional in other
public facilities. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses).
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 492-93 (1954).
15. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-60 (1973).
16. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457-65 (1988).
17. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
18. The class-action suit was initiated by parents whose children attended school
in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San
Antonio, Texas. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5-6. The suit was also brought on behalf of
schoolchildren throughout the state of Texas who were also members of minority
groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax
base. Id. at 6.
19. For the 1970-71 school year, local property taxes contributed 41.1% of all
public school funds. The state aid program, in the form of the Foundation Program,
contributed 48% and federal funds contributed 10.9% of total amount spent on
public schools. Id., at 11 n. 21. The Foundation Program, which was ostensively
designed to provide an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school
districts, called for state and local contributions to a fund earmarked specifically for
teacher salaries, operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, supplying
funds from its general revenues, financed approximately 80%0 of the Program, and
the school districts were responsible - as a unit - for providing the remaining 2076.
411 U.S. at 10-11.
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range of courses than were provided at schools with substantially
20
more funds.
While conceding that the Texas school-financing scheme resulted
in major disparities in amount of per-pupil revenue available among
the various school districts, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
upheld the financing scheme at least in part on the basis 2' that
education was not a "fundamental right" or "liberty" protected by
the United States Constitution.

22

Although the Court, citing Brown v. Board of Education,23
recognized that education was of great importance in our democratic
society, it stated that "[t]he mere importance of a service performed
by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause." ' 24 While not denying the nexus between the right to an
education and the right to the effective exercise of First Amendment
and political and civic freedoms, the Court observed that it had never
guaranteed the citizenry "the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice." ' 25 The Court stated that no charge could
20. Id. at 85. In evaluating this claim, the Court compared the funding received
by the most affluent district in the San Antonio area, the Alamo Heights Independent
School District, to the plaintiffs' school district, the Edgewood Independent School
District, during the 1967-68 school year. In that year, Alamo received a total amount
in revenues of $594 per pupil, while Edgewood received only $356 per pupil. Id. at
13-14.
21. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Texas school-financing scheme violated
the equal protection clause by discriminating against them on the basis of wealth.
The Court held, however, the plaintiffs did not qualify as a class discriminated on
the basis of wealth. Id. at 26.
The Court held that the plaintiffs' had failed to show that the Texas schoolfinancing scheme discriminated against a class of definably "poor" persons such as
a class fairly definable as indigent persons, or composed of persons whose incomes
are beneath any designated poverty level. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
Texas financing scheme did not "operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect
class" and therefore, strict scrutiny could not be invoked. Id. at 29-30.
As pointed out by Justice Marshall in his dissent, the district court below had
made the contrary conclusion that the Texas financing scheme drew a "distinction
between groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the district in which they
live," and thus created a disadvantaged class composed of persons living in propertypoor districts. Id. at 92. Justice Marshall called into question the majority's apparent
conclusion that "precise identification of the particular individuals who compose the
disadvantaged class" is a necessary predicate to equal protection analysis. Id. at 94.
22. Id. at 35-36. The Court held that the right to an education was neither
implicit nor explicit in the Constitution.
23. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
25. 411 U.S. at 36 (emphasis in original).
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fairly be made that the Texas financing scheme did not provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire the "basic minimal skills"
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of free speech and full
participation in the political process.16 Finally, the Court questioned
the limitations of the plaintiffs' nexus theory. The Court reasoned
that the right to decent food and shelter was as significant (if not
more so) to the likely participation of voters as the benefit of
education 27
Having determined that strict scrutiny was not the appropriate
standard of review, the Court reviewed the Texas' school financing
scheme under the traditional standard of review: rational basis.2" The
Court held that the financing scheme was rationally related to two
identified state-objectives: 1) assuring a basic education for every child
in the state; 29 and 2) encouraging a large measure of local control
over each district's schools.30
As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, the Court's reliance
upon the Texas legislature's determination of what a "basic education" embodies was fundamentally inconsistent with its own recognition that educational authorities were unable to agree upon what
constitutes educational quality.3' In fact, by expressing its expertise in
determining that particular levels of funding provided by the Program
26. 411 U.S. at 38.
27. Id.; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1979) (Constitution does not
create a right to the necessities of life).
28. 411 U.S. at 40. Under the traditional standard of review, a state's law must
be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. 411 U.S. at
40.
29. 411 U.S. at 49. The Court found that Texas provided a "basic education"
to every child through the Minimum Foundation Program that was "designed to
provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school in the State."
411 U.S. at 44-45. While acknowledging that the primary distinguishing attributes of
schools in property - affluent districts was lower pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary
schedules, the Court stated that the deleterious effects from these disparities, if any,
on a child's education were not proved to be significant. 411 U.S. at 46-47 n. 101.
30. 411 U.S. at 49. The Court determined that Texas' school-financing scheme,
with its heavy reliance upon local property taxes, provided a rational means to secure
local control over each district's schools. 411 U.S. at 47-55. The Court held that
local control over decisions affecting the education of one's child is a permissible,
even vital, governmental objective. 411 U.S. at 49 (citing Wright v. Council of
Emperia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)). The Court stated that local control allowed parents
the freedom to devote more money to their child's education and to participate in
the decision making process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent.
411 U.S. at 49-51.
31. 411 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

1991:451

EQUAL EDUCATION

assured an adequate educational quality, it seemed that the majority

itself was acting as a "super-legislature"

which it cautioned the

3 2
minority against being.
While ratifying the sufficiency of the State's provision of a "basic
education," the Court acknowledged that it lacked specialized knowledge and experience in the area of education. 3 Essentially, the Court

seems to have thrown up its "hands" because it believed that certain

social and philosophical problems were beyond the Court's compre-

hension.34 Whatever may have been the extent of knowledge of the
requirements of an adequate education at the time that the Court
decided Rodriguez, there can be no doubt at this time that attractive
salaries and low pupil-teacher ratios are necessary for a "basic edu-

cation." 35 It is only axiomatic that the more affluent school districts
offering higher salaries will attract the most qualified teachers, if not
36
the only qualified teachers.

Although the Court relied on local control as a justification for

rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the plaintiffs had attacked the Texas
school-financing scheme precisely because, in their view, the statute
32. 411 U.S. at 31.
33. 411 U.S. at 42-43.
34. 411 U.S. at 42-43. But see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). The Court relied upon modern psychological knowledge and authority in
determining that separate educational facilities for blacks and whites were inherently
unequal. The Court also determined that providing separate public school facilities
for children based solely on race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever
be undone." Id. at 494.
35. See generally The National Commission on Excellence of Education, U.S.
Department of Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperativefor Education Reform
(April 1983) [hereinafter Nation at Risk]. This study concluded that severe shortages
of certain types of teachers exist in the fields of mathematics, science, foreign
languages and among specialists in education for the gifted and talented, language
minority and handicapped students. Id. at 23. The study attributes low teacher
salaries as a main cause of this shortage. Id. at 22-23, 30-31. See also U.S. Department
of Education, American Education:Making It Work 41-43 (April 1988). (The followup study to Nation at Risk confirmed that while "moderate" progress had been
relieved since 1983, we as a nation are still at risk as our students know too little,
and their command of essential skills is too slight; good schools for the disadvantaged
and minority children are much too rare, and the dropout rate among black and
hispanic youth in many of our inner cities is perilously high.).
36. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 86-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (In the 19681969 school year, the top salary of the property-poor Edgewood Independent School
District was approximately 80% of the property-rich Alamo Heights School District.
Coincidentally, in that same school year, 100% of Alamo Heights teachers had college
degrees while only 80% of the teachers in Edgewood had college degrees).
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did not provide the same level of local and fiscal flexibility to all
school districts.37 In fact, the plaintiffs argued that local control could
be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that would
result in more equality in education expenditures.3" The Court, however, held that because strict scrutiny was not required, the state need
not chose the least restrictive alternative to achieve its purpose. 9
Moreover, the Court held that "some inequality" in the treatment of
individuals was not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the
entire system.4
The Court's conclusion that the Texas financing scheme, with its
heavy reliance on local property taxes, was rationally related to the
purpose of local control over public schools is plainly illogical. As
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, in Texas statewide laws
already regulated the most minute details of local education such as
textbook selection, teacher qualifications and the length of the school
day. 4 1 In response to Justice Marshall's observation, the Court attempted to show that local school boards retained substantial control
over schools by maintaining day-to-day authority over "management
and control" of public schools, by exercising their authority to acquire
land by eminent domain, by hiring and terminating teachers and other
personnel, and by exercising various other functions.4 2 Yet, the Court
failed to acknowledge that these powers, enumerated in the Texas
Education Code, merely existed because the State delegated them to
the local school boards. The Court also failed to articulate any reason
why the State's increased financial contribution to local school boards
would, by itself, cause the state to repeal such statutes. Furthermore,
many of the duties of the local school boards such as hiring teachers
and maintaining order and discipline were not likely to be discharged
by the state due to its increased funding of local schools.
Justice Marshall chastised the Court for suggesting that because
"some 'adequate' level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination
43
in the provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable.
Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not
addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable
inequities of state action. It mandates that nothing less than that 'all
37. 411 U.S. at 50.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 51-52.
411 U.S. at 126-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 52 n. 108.
411 U.S. at 89-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'"4 In Justice
Marshall's view, it is inequality-not some notion of gross inadequacy-of educational opportunity that raises a question of denial of
45
equal protection of the laws.
Justice Marshall further disagreed with the Court's holding that
the determination of whether an interest is fundamental is always
dependent on whether that interest is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution." He explained that certain interests, while not
explicitly guaranteed under the Constitution, have been considered
fundamental rights that are entitled to strict scrutiny because they are,
47
to some extent, interrelated to constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Thus, there are instances where, due to the interests at stake, the
Court has accorded constitutional protection to the right to procreate,
the right to vote in state elections and the right to an appeal from a
criminal conviction."
While the Court proclaimed in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that its
decision "in no way detracts from our historic dedication to public
education, ' 49 it would be difficult to interpret the Court's decision to
mean anything else. Despite the Court's attempt to establish a framework by which certain interests can qualify as fundamental rights, it
is clear that the Court's ruling was more influenced by its reluctance
44. 411 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. 411 U.S. at 91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As such, Justice Marshall found
that the plaintiffs had "made a substantial showing of wide variations in educational
funding and the resulting educational opportunity afforded to the schoolchildren of
Texas." Moreover, he concluded that "this discrimination was, in large measure,
attributable to significant disparities in the taxable wealth of local Texas school
districts." Id.
46. 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Under his theory of a "sliding scale" of judicial scrutiny, Justice Marshall stated
that in each case the Court should "examine the extent to which constitutionally
guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution." 411
U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained that, "[a]s the
nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest
draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree
of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis
must be adjusted accordingly." 411 U.S. at 102-03. Justice Marshall recognized that
"the pivotal position of education to success in American society and the essential
role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an
importance that is undeniable." Id. at 113. Therefore, education should be recognized
as a fundamental right under the Constitution. Id. at 117.
47. 411 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. 411 U.S. at 101-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. 411 U.S. at 30.
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to take the bold step of striking down a school-financing scheme,
which in the Court's own words, was "comparable to the systems
employed in virtually every other State." 50 The Court's failure to
recognize education as a fundamental right did indeed constitute an
abandonment of its "historic dedication to public education," which
was motivated more by its fear to challenge state legislation, which
would have had broad-ranging consequences to the nation as a whole,
than by constitutional principles."
B. PL YLER V. DOE

In Plyler v. Doe,5 2 the Court was once again called upon to
determine the constitutionally of a provision of Texas' education laws.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a Texas statute that denied a
free education to school-age children, illegally admitted into this
country, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In reviewing the legislation at issue, the Court applied an "intermediate" level of scrutiny," rather than the traditional level of
scrutiny of mere rationality endorsed by the Court in Rodriguez. The
Court held that the legislation violated the equal protection clause
because it created a classification that failed to "further a substantial
interest of the State. 5 4 In determining that this level of scrutiny was
appropriate, the Court considered the character of the classification,
the importance of the governmental benefit, and the asserted state
interest in support of the classification.55
50. 411 U.S. at 47-48. The Court also stated that, "It would be difficult to
imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one
now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public
education presently in existence in virtually every State." 411 U.S. at 44.
51. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart also seemed to emphasize his
concern that striking down Texas' school-financing scheme would have a significant
impact upon other State's financing schemes. In the first sentence of his opinion he
noted that "[tihe method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every
other State, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described
as chaotic and unjust." 411 U.S. at 58 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
52. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
53. 457 U.S. at 218 n.16. The Court noted that a middle-level of scrutiny was
suitable for certain class-based denials of rights which, although not explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, "give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties." 457 U.S. at 217-18 nn. 15-16; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (gender); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (illegitimacy).
54. 457 U.S. at 217-18.
55. See 411 U.S. at 220-31. Although the Court did not acknowledge using this
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While acknowledging that education is not a "right" granted to
individuals by the Constitution, the Court stated that, "Neither is it

merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms
of social welfare legislation." '5 6 The Court stated that, "Both the
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark this

distinction." 7 The Court also recognized that "the public schools are
a vital civic institution necessary for the preservation of a democratic
system of government," 5 8 and "the primary vehicle for transmitting
the values on which our society rests." 5 9 In sum, the Court concluded
that education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
our society.
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger criticized the Court's analysis of
the proper level of review. He noted that while the Court held that

illegitimate aliens are not a "suspect class," and that education is not
a "fundamental right," the Court, by "patching together bits and
pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis," spun out a theory custom-tailored to the facts
test in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, in writing on behalf of the
majority, Justice Brennan, made reference to each of these elements. See San Antonio
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 519-20 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
56. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
57. Id. at 221. The Court stated that the stigma of illiteracy imposed upon this
discrete class of children was of more importance than the abstract question of
whether the Texas statute discriminated against a suspect class or whether education
was a fundamental right. 457 U.S. at 223. The Court noted that "[b]y denying these
children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of
our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute
in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation." 457 U.S. at 224. In light of
these "countervailing costs," the Court determined that the Texas statute could
"hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State."
457 U.S. at 225.
58. 457 U.S. at 220 (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963)).
The people of the United States need to know that individuals in our society who do
not possess the level of skill, literacy, and training essential to the new era will be
effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that accompany
competent performance, but also from the chance to participate fully in our national
life. A high level of shared education is essential to a free, democratic society ...
For our country to function, citizens must be able to reach some common understanding on complex issues, often on short notice and on basis of conflicting or incomplete
evidence."
Id.

59. 457 U.S. at 221 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)).
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of this case. 60 After concluding that strict scrutiny was not the
appropriate standard of review, Chief Justice Burger reviewed the
legislation under the rational basis level of scrutiny, and found it to
6
be constitutional. 1
The inadequacy of the two-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis has been evident in recent years by the Court's use of a
middle-level of review for classifications such as illegitimacy6 2 and
gender. 63 In Plyler, the Court introduced a new formula for determining when intermediate-level scrutiny should be applied. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, determined the appropriate standard by
balancing a quasi-fundamental right-education-and a discrete, identifiable class-children of illegal aliens-which created the need for a
heightened level of review. 64 Plyler was an attempt by the Court to
circumvent some of the damage done to the concept of a right to an
equal education caused by the Rodriquez decision; however, the Plyler
balancing approach has been undercut by more recent decisions. 6
C. PAPASAN V. ALLAIN

In Papasan v. Allain,66 the plaintiffs, school children and local
school officials, brought an action against state officials challenging
Mississippi's distribution of public land funds. The plaintiffs contended that the State's sale of lands, reserved by the federal government for the benefit of public schools in 23 counties, formerly held
by the Chickasaw Indian Nation, 67 resulted in a disparity in per-pupil
funding which denied students living in those counties a "minimally
adequate education. ' 6 The plaintiffs asserted that this disparity vio69
lated the equal protection clause.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim properly stated a cause of action.70 The Court began
60.
61.
*62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
457 U.S. at 252 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-24 (1982).
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schs. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
478 U.S. 265, 286-87 (1986).
478 U.S. at 274-75.
478 U.S. at 273-74.
478 U.S. at 274.
478 U.S. at 283. The district court had "dismissed the complaint, holding

[the plaintiffs'] claims [were] barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by

the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution." 478 U.S. at 275. The
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its analysis of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim by examining the
meaning and effect of its decisions in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and
Plyler v. Doe.7 While acknowledging that the Court declined to apply
any measure of heightened scrutiny to the legislation at issue in
Rodriguez, based on either wealth as a suspect class or education as
a fundamental right, the Court stated that it had not foreclosed the
"possibility that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either
[the right to speak or the right to vote.]" ' 7 Regarding Plyler, the
Court explained that while it had not "measurably change[d] the
approach articulated in Rodriguez," it had nevertheless "concluded
that the justifications for the discrimination offered by the State were
'wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children,
'7
the State, and the Nation.'
The Court further stated that, "As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate,
this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions [of] whether
a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether
a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe [upon] that right should
be accorded heightened equal protection review." ' 74 The Court concluded, however, that this case did not "require resolution of these
issues."

75

The Court determined that based on the disparities that the
complaint alleged and that were documented in the public record, the
applicable standard of review was dictated by Rodriguez. 76 The Court
asserted, however, that "this is a very different claim than the claim
made in Rodriguez. ' 77 In contrast to Rodriguez, the Court pointed
out that the plaintiffs were not challenging the "overall organization
of the Mississippi public school financing program," but rather, "their
' 78
challenge [was] restricted to one aspect of that program.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds, "agreeing

that [some of] the relief requested in the [plaintiffs'] complaint was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment," while their equal protection claim sought a current, ongoing
remedy which would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 275. "Even
so, it found [that the] dismissal of the complaint to be proper since [the] differential
funding [claims were] not unconstitutional under the Court's decision in San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez." Id.(citation omitted).
71. 478 U.S. at 283-88.
72. 478 U.S. at 284 (quoting San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973)).
73. 478 U.S. at 286 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 US. 202, 230 (1982)).
74. 478 U.S. at 285.
75. 478 U.S. at 286.
76. Id.

77. 478 U.S. at 287.
78. Id.
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The Court explained that in Rodriquez funding disparities based
on differing local wealth were a necessary adjunct of allowing meaningful local control school funding; whereas, the differential financing
in Papasanwas traceable "to a state decision to divide state resources
unequally among school districts."7 9
Even so, the Court maintained that the question remained as to
whether the variations in the benefits received by the school districts
were rationally related to a legitimate state interest.8 0 The Court
declined to address this issue and remanded the case to the district
court with the instruction that it should address the following question: "Given that the State has title to assets granted to it by the
Federal Government for the use of the State's schools, does the Equal
Protection Clause permit it to distribute the benefit of these assets
unequally among the school districts as it now does?"" a
D. KADRMAS V. DICKINSON PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Public Schools, 2 held that an indigent child who lived sixteen miles
from the nearest school and was assessed a fee for bus service was
not denied equal protection. The plaintiffs contended that the user
fee charged by the Dickinson Public Schools deprived those who could
not afford to pay it "minimum access to education," 3 and that the
state statute authorizing such fees should be subject to the standard
of review of "heightened" scrutiny applied by the Court in Plyler v.

Doe.84

The Court explained, however, that this standard of review "has
generally been applied only in cases that involved discriminatory
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." 5 While recognizing that
it had applied a "heightened level of scrutiny" in Plyler, the Court
stated that it "[had] not extended this holding beyond the 'unique
79. 478 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).

80. 478 U.S. at 289.
81. Id. Justice Powell dissented on the ground that "the Equal Protection
Clause, at least in the context of state funding of schools, is concerned with substance,
not with the de minimus variations of funding among the districts." 478 U.S. at 300.
82. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
83. 487 U.S. at 458. The Court noted that because the plaintiff, Sarita Kadrmas,
was able to continue to attend school during the time she was denied access to the

school bus, the plaintiffs must "mean to argue that the busing fee unconstitutionally
places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than it does in the path
of wealthier families." Id.
84. 487 U.S. at 459.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
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circumstances, 8 6 that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and
rationales."'"7
The Court further distinguished Plyler by observing that unlike
the children in that case, the plaintiff Sarita Kadrmas had not been
penalized by tie government for the illegal conduct of her parents.88
On the contrary, Sarita was denied access to the school bus only
because her parents would not agree to pay the same user fee charged
to all other families that took advantage of the service. Nor do we
see any reason to suppose that this user fee will 'promot[e] the
creation and perpetuation of a sub-class of illiterates within our
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment,
welfare, and crime.' 8 9
The Court concluded, therefore, that "heightened" scrutiny was
not the appropriate standard of review where the statute did not
discriminate against a suspect class, nor interfere with a fundamental
right. 90 Upon reviewing the statute under the rational basis test, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs had "failed to carry the heavy
burden of demonstrating that the statute [was] arbitrary and irrational."

91

In dissent, Justice Marshall disputed the Court's view of the
statute at issue in this case as involving the provision of transportation,
rather than the provision of educational services. 92 In Justice Marshall's view, this case involved "state action that placed a special
burden on poor families in their pursuit of education." 93 "Children
living far from school can receive a public education only if they have
access to transportation; as the state court noted in this case, 'a child
must reach the schoolhouse door as a prerequisite to receiving the
educational opportunity offered therein.'

' 94

Justice Marshall believed

therefore that this case presented the question "whether a State may
discriminate against the poor in providing access to education." 95

ring)).

86. Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concur87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 US. 202, 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
487 U.S. at 459.
Id., (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
487 U.S. at 465.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
487 U.S. at 467.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. Justice Marshall stated that while the Court had determined that

91. Id.

classifications based on wealth were not automatically suspect, such classifications
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Justice Marshall observed that "a statute that erects special
obstacles to education in the path of the poor naturally tends to
consign such persons to their current disadvantaged status.

' 96

By

denying an equal opportunity to exactly those who need it most,
Justice Marshall opined that the law not only militates against the
ability of each poor child to advance himself or herself, but also
increases the likelihood of the creation of a discrete and permanent
underclass. 97 Since the State's rationale for this policy was based
entirely on fiscal considerations,9" Justice Marshall concluded that its
interest was insubstantial and did not begin to justify the discrimination challenged in this case."
Beginning with its 1973 decision in Rodriquez, the United States
Supreme Court has shown a great deal of indifference to its previously
expressed commitment in Brown v. Board of Education to support
the right to an equal education. While in its decisions such as Plyler
v. Doe and Papasan v. Allain the Court has accorded the right to an
equal education an elevated status by evaluating the subject legislation
under a "heightened scrutiny" standard of review, the Court has also
declined to apply this same standard most recently in Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public School. Having clearly abdicated its mandate as
expressed in Brown to enforce the right to an equal education, the
only hope of protecting this "most important function of state and
local governments" lies with the judiciary of each individual state.
II.

THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Education is today a national problem. Our national defense
posture and our ability to compete in the world economic market are
irretrievably tied into our educational system. Furthermore, our system of government and the exercise of our individual liberties are
dependent upon an educated citizenry. However, the recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court signal that it is unlikely that the
"have a measure of special constitutional significance." 487 U.S. at 468. He noted
that the Court had repeatedly "invalidated statutes, on their face or as applied, that
discriminated against the poor." Id. Moreover, he stated that the Court had proved
"most likely to take such action when the Iaws in question interfered with the access
of the poor to the political and judicial processes." Id.
96. 487 U.S. at 470.
97. Id.
98. Justice Marshall observed that the statute allowed Dickinson and other
nonreorganized school districts to charge a flat fee for bus service so that these
districts may recoup part of the costs of the service. 487 U.S. at 471.
99. Id.
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Court will take a leading role, at least in the near future, in ensuring
the right to an equal education.'00 Also, neither the president nor
congress show any real inclination to lead in this area. Unless this
situation changes, millions of undereducated children will pass through
the nation's school systems and join the ranks of those who cannot
fully compete in the technological society of the future.
Immediate attention will therefore have to be focused on the
problem at the state level. The Illinois Constitution offers Illinois
residents both a right to an education and protection against inequality.
Article X, section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides
that:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services. Education
in public schools through the secondary level shall be free.
There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the
system of public education.' 0 '
This provision differs from the provisions of the three earlier
Illinois Constitutions. Neither the Constitution of 1818 nor the Constitution of 1848 contained an education article or any mention of a
right to an education. Article VIII, section 1 of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution provided that "[t]he general assembly shall provide a
thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of
02
this state may receive a good common school education."'
The Bill of Rights in the 1970 Illinois Constitution further
provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws.'0 3 The Constitutions of 1818, 1848, or 1870 did not contain
equal protection clauses, although the Constitutions of 1848, 1870
4
and 1970 do prohibit the legislature from passing special legislation.0

100. See supra part I.

art. X, § 1 (1970).
art. VIII, § 1 (1870).
art. I, § 2 (1970).
art. IV, § 13 (1970); ILL. CONST., art. IV, § 22 (1870); ILL.
CONST., art. III, §§ 32, 36 (1848).
101.
102.
103.
104.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

CONSTr,
CONST.,
CONST.,
CONST.,
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Unlike the Illinois Constitution, the United States Constitution

does not contain any reference to education. However, the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads the same as
Article 1, section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Because recent
United States Supreme Court decisions have involved only an inter-

pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, those decisions are not
dispositive whether the Illinois Constitution independently protects
the right to an equal education under Article X, section 1 or Article
I, section 2.101

The courts of a number of states have interpreted their state

constitutions to require equal funding for public education.'06 Some
of these decisions have been based on independent interpretations of

state equal protection clauses. 07 Other decisions are grounded on the
education articles contained in their respective state constitutions.108
Others rely on both provisions.109

The Illinois Constitution may provide its residents with greater

rights than are accorded by the United States Constitution and Illinois

courts are obligated to protect those rights independently of those
provided by the United States Constitution."10 Therefore, we will

105. There is no dispute that the state courts can interpret their state constitutions
different from how the United States Supreme Court interprets the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
106. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989),
modified, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1978);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141
(Wisc. 1976); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
107. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976); Washakie County School
Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
108. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989), modified, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
109. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist.
No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
110. In Longress v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. 308, 316 (1882), the Illinois
Supreme Court held that an Illinois school board had no authority to segregate black
children in the public schools. The Court relied solely on Illinois law, noting that:
Whether the fourteenth amendment would prohibit school directors or boards of
education from excluding colored children from the public schools by the adoption
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independently examine both the right to an education under Article
10, Section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and the nature of
equality under Article 1, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution.
III.

THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION UNDER ARTICLE X,

SECTION

1

OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

The 1970 Constitution, Article X, section 1, states that it is a
fundamental goal to educate "all persons to the limits of their
capacities.""' To accomplish this goal, the State must provide for an
efficient system of high quality education." 2 This is not discretionary;
the Constitution mandates that the State "shall" do it. Education
must be free at least through the secondary level and the State has
the primary responsibility to see that the system is financed." 3
The history of Article X, section 1 is instructive. Rather than
expressing a goal, Article VIII, section 1 of the 1870 Constitution had
stated that the General Assembly must provide "a thorough and
efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may
receive a good common school education." The change of wording
in 1970 indicates a change in focus. As the wording indicates, in 1870
the focus was on having the General Assembly establish a public
school system. The wording in the 1970 Constitution shifts the focus
to the quality of the education provided to the individual student
regardless of the school district in which the student is found. As
discussed below, this new focus on individuals is reflected in the
legislative history and case law interpreting Article X, section 1.
and enforcement of such rules as have been adopted in this case, is a question which
we do not deem it necessary to determine here. We base our decision on the
constitution and laws of the State. The people of the State have the right to make
such a constitution, and enact such laws under it, as they deem for the best interests
of the public, and so long as our laws do not conflict with the constitution of the
United States they must be held valid and binding upon the people of the State.
Under our law, aside from the fourteenth amendment, directors of schools and
boards of education, like defendants in error, have no discretion to deny a pupil of
the proper age admission to the public schools on account of nationality, color or
religion.

Longress v. Board of Educ., 101 Ill. 308, 316 (1882). See also, Rollins v. Ellwood,
565 N.E.2d 1302 (Ill. 1990); Hartigan v. Kennedy, 576 N.E.2d 107 (Il. App. 1991);
McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique
of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1987); Michael P. Seng,
Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, and Freedom of Religion Under the Illinois
Constitution, 21 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 91 (1989).
111. ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1920).

112. Id.
113. Id.
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A. THE GOAL OF EDUCATING ALL PERSONS TO THE LIMITS OF THEIR
CAPACITIES

The Illinois Supreme Court had many occasions to construe
Article VIII, section 1 of the 1870 Constitution. In People ex rel.
Longress v. Board of Education," 4 the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that Article VIII, section 1 required the General Assembly to provide
schools whereby "all children may receive a good public school
education" and made "no distinction in regard to the race or color
of the children of the State who are entitled to share in the benefits
to be derived from our public schools.""' Relying on the Constitution
and the statutes implementing it, the Court held that no pupil of
proper age could be denied admission to a public school on account

6
of race or color."
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Article VIII,
section 1 requirement that all children receive a good common school
education to require a school district to allow children residing in an

orphan's home to attend, without paying tuition, the free schools of
that district." 7 The court noted that every child of school age in the
State is entitled to attend the public school in the district in which he
or she actually resides for the time being, whether that be the place
of his or her legal domicile or the legal domicile of his or her parents
or guardian or not.""

114. 101 Ill.
308 (1882).

115. 101 Ill. at 313. The Illinois Supreme Court's liberal or literal reading of
this constitutional provision compares favorably with the same interpretations given
by other high state courts of their state constitutions which contained similar
provisions. In Ohio v. McGann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 207 (1871), the court denied a writ
of mandamus to a black youth seeking admission into an all white school where the

state constitution provided that the "general assembly shall . . .secure a thorough

and efficient system of common schools throughout the State." in essence, the court
held that black children were not denied a "common school education" where they
enjoyed substantially equal advantages in separate schools from white children. Id.
See also Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362 (1874); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 50
(1874). Contra Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266, 271 (1868); Nevada v.
Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 346 (1872).

116. In an earlier case, the Illinois Supreme Court, without directly referring to
Article VIII, section 1, stated that school directors "have no power to make class
distinctions, neither can they discriminate between scholars on account of their color,
race or social position." Chase v. Stephenson, 71 111. 383, 385 (1874).
117. Ashley v. Board of Education, 114 N.E. 20 (I11.
1916). See also Logsdon
v. Jones, 143 N.E. 56 (I11.
1924).
118.
Ashley, 114 N.E. at 21.
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In Department of Welfare v. Haas,"9 parents of a feebleminded
child argued that they should not be responsible for paying the fees
for educating their child in a State mental institution. The Illinois
Supreme Court backed away from the commitment that all children
in Illinois are entitled to receive an education. The Court held that
Article VIII, section 1 did not require the State to provide a free
educational program for those children who were unable to receive
20
the training available in the regular common schools.
The cases interpreting Article VIII, section 1 of the 1870 Constitution thus established that all children residing in a district have a
right to be educated on an equal basis, but that a district has no duty
to provide facilities to accommodate special cases. The right to an
education was only a right to "common schooling." The changed
wording in the 1970 Constitution, which makes it a state goal to
educate all persons to the limits of their capacities, shifts the focus
from a "common school" education to the individual person. The
emphasis has changed from that of setting up school districts where
all children have an equal opportunity to be educated to that of
providing educational opportunities for all persons in the state regardless of the school district where the child happens to be.
The 1970 Constitution goes beyond the 1870 Constitution and its
case law with its new emphasis on educating all persons to the limits
of their capacities.12' In introducing Article X, section 1 to the
Convention, Delegate Paul Mathias emphasized that "We are pointing
1958).
119. 154.N.E.2d 265 (Ill.
120. Id. at 220. The Court stated that existing legislation did not require the
State to provide a free educational program, as a part-of the common school system,
for the feeble minded or mentally deficient children who, because of limited intelligence, were unable to receive a good common school education. Id.
The delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention revised the education
article to require the legislature to create programs of instruction for those suffering
from mental or physical handicaps. 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 764 (1970) [hereinafter "REcoRD"]. In Elliot v. Board
App. Ct. 1978), the court upheld the right of
of Educ., 380 N.E.2d 1137 (I11.
handicapped students to special education classes. The court held that the "present

constitution establishes an entitlement broader than the former provision which
mandated only free common school education." Id. at 1142. But see Gary B. v.
1980); Max M. v. Thompson, 566 F. Supp.
Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 102, 113 (N.D. I11.
1330, 1339 (N.D. 11.1983), modified on rehearing on other grounds, 585 F. Supp.
317 (N.D. I11. 1984) (handicapped child's right to a free education under the Illinois
Constitution did not include a provision for psychotherapy).
121. See Elliot v. Board of Educ., 380 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978),
where the Court found the 1970 Constitution to be broader than the 1870 Constitution

in its mandate of free education.
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out we want opportunities beyond the elementary and secondary
schools-opportunities for the handicapped as well as the normal
22

individual.",'
In one sense, the first paragraph of Article X, section 1 of the
1970 Constitution is more limited than its 1870 counterpart in that it
states a goal rather than a mandate, as does the 1870 Constitution,
that the General Assembly "shall provide." However, the goal is
more than a mere aspiration. It informs and determines the interpretation of the remaining paragraphs of Article X, section 1, and
provides a rule of construction for state legislative enactments. The
goal is thus similar to the statements of objectives found in other
constitutions which provide standards for the courts to measure and
interpret other constitutional provisions and ambiguous statutes. 2 3
Clearly, the drafters of the 1970 Constitution did not view the
first clause of Article X, section 1 as purely hortatory. They intended
it to be effectuated through the remaining provisions in Article X. In
speaking for the Article, Delegate Sam Patch emphasized the relationship between the goal in paragraph 1 of section 1 and the duty in
paragraph 2:
But we would be remiss if we did not provide, in our report
for our article, a means for implementation of this transcendent goal. Therefore, the Committee states in paragraph 2 of
section 1 of Article VIII, 'To achieve this goal, it shall be the
duty of the state to provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services.' The paramount goal is education; therefore, the duty is of the same

status. 124

Again, in response to a question from Delegate Charles Coleman
whether there was a mandate given to the executive branch or the
General Assembly to provide for the goal, Delegate Patch emphasized:
Yes, Delegate Coleman, this is one thing that we deliberated
on for quite a long period of time. That is why we indicated
that the goal is paramount, and in our section paragraph we
tried to state: 'to achieve this paramount goal, it shall be the
122.
123.

RECORD,
CONST.

supra n. 120, at 762.
§§ 45, 46 (1949); CONST. Nia., ch. 2 § 18 (1979).

INDIA, pt. 4,

Damisha v. Speaker, Benue State [1983] 4 N.C.L.R. 625, 631 (High Ct. Adikpo);
Archbishop Okogie v. Attorney Gen. of Lagos State, [1981] 2 N.C.L.R. 337, 350
(Fed. Ct. App. Lagos); D. BAsU, INTRODUCTION To THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 137
(8th ed. 1980).
124. RECORD,

supra note 120, at 764.
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duty. . .' Now it would have been redundant to say the duty
is paramount in the language, but after a goal has been
identified as being paramount, and you mandate a state to
carry out this goal-therefore, we said the whole state, that
is, the executive branch as well as the General Assembly. 125
An amendment to delete section 1 and to substitute the language
of the 1870 Constitution on the ground that section 1 put educational
needs above all other needs of state government was defeated by the
delegates. 26 An amendment to change the original proposal from "the
27
paramount goal".to "a fundamental goal" did carry.' It was explained that, "fundamental" better expressed the intent of the education committee, which looked upon education as the basis for the
exercise of all other rights of the individual. 128
The initial approach of the Illinois Supreme Court in interpreting
29
Article X, section 1 was cautious. In Pierce v. Board of Education,'
the Illinois Supreme Court refused to interpret Article X, section 1 to
require a school board to place a specific child in a special education
class. The parents of a child who suffered a learning disability sued
for damages sustained by him when he was placed with students not
suffering learning disabilities. The court explained that Article X,
section 1 was not self-executing: "Its pronouncement of the laudable
goal of 'the educational development of all persons to the limits of
their capacities' is a statement of general philosophy, rather than a
30
mandate that certain means be provided in any specific form."' The
Court, therefore, found it necessary to examine state statutes and
regulations implementing special education programs in Illinois. The
Court held that under state law it was the State Board of Education
and not the local school board that is responsible for determining
eligibility for special education and, therefore, the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action.' 3 '
The substance of the holding in Pierce was not that Article X,
section 1, was inoperative. The Court accepted the "goal" that all
supra note 120, at 766 (1970).
supra note 120, at 792-93, 805.
127. RECORD, supra note 120, at 803.
128. It was explained that paramount means "chief, principal, top sawyer, first
fiddle, biggest frog in the pond, king, prima donna, or star," whereas fundamental
means "substance, essential, center, kernel, the meat, the core, the heart, the soul."
RECORD, supra note 120, at 802.
129. 370 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. 1977).
130. Id. at 536.
125.

126.

RECORD,

RECORD,

131. Id. at 537.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

persons should be educated to the limits of their capacities but held
that the State has discretion in determining which agency will effec13 2
tuate this goal.
B. THE DUTY TO ESTABLISH AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF HIGH
QUALITY PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICES

While paragraph one of Article X, section 1 is stated as a goal,
paragraph two imposes a mandatory duty on the State.' 33 In introducing this paragraph, Delegate Patch observed:
The state is mandated to provide a system that is thorough,
complete, and useful to all the people of Illinois. To provide
a total quality public education, the state shall institute an
educational system of the highest quality that will not only
meet the educational needs of today, but will be able to adjust
to the educational demands in a progressive and ever changing
and highly qualified society of tomorrow. As higher education
and academic excellence is demanded by society, the state's
mandate for high-quality education will expand to meet its
34
demand.
Paragraph two of Article X, section 1 of the 1970 Constitution
is different from the 1870 Constitution. The 1870 Constitution required the State to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free
schools" where all children could receive "a good common school
education."'' 3 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted Article XIII,
section 1, to make it the duty of the legislature to establish "a
thorough and efficient system of free schools" but interpreted "a
good common school education" as "a limitation upon the power of
the legislature as to the character of education to be afforded by the
system of free schools to be established and maintained."' 36
Difficulties arose in defining what was "a good common school
education." In Richards v. Raymond,'37 it was argued that the clause
''common school" did not include the power to establish high
schools.
However, the supreme court held that no definition of a common
school was provided in the Constitution and hence it was left to the
legislature to determine what constituted a good common school
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Cf. Elliot v. Board of Education, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
Id.
REcoRD, supra note 120, at 764.
ILL. CONST., art XIII, § 1 (1820).
Powell v. Board of Educ., 97 I11.375, 378 (1881).
92 Ill. 612 (1879).
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education. In later opinions the Court held that high schools were as
schools and that the
much a part of our system of education as 3grade
8
state had a duty to maintain high schools.'
In People v. Graham,'3 9 the supreme court relied upon the School
Code of 1825 to define "a good common school education." The
1825 Code stated:
Believing that the advancement of literature always has been and ever
will be the means of developing more fully the rights of man, that
the mind of every citizen in the republic is the common property of
society and constitutes the basis of its strength and happiness, it is
therefore considered the peculiar duty of a free government like ours
to encourage and extend the improvement and cultivation of the
intellectual energies of the whole.' 40
Although the court consistently held that it was for the legislature
and not for the courts to determine what was "a good commonschool education," ''41 the court recognized that the constitution did
put two limitations on the legislature when implementing that concept:
must be free and must be
"The schools established, i.e., the system,
1 42
discrimination."'
without
all
to
open
In 1958, the supreme court narrowly interpreted "common school
education" to exclude special education for those of limited intelligence. 14 The court held that the State had no duty to provide special
facilities for a boy described as "mentally deficient or feeble minded."
The court noted that the term "common school education" implies
"the capacity, as well as the right, to receive the common training,
otherwise the educational process cannot function."14
The 1970 Constitution removed the term "a good common school
education." The Education Committee, which drafted the Article,
wanted to insure that the mentally and physically handicapped as well
as all other disadvantaged children would be given a free education
"to the limits of their capacities.' '4 5 The Education Committee also
1919); Cook v. Board of
138. People v. C. & N.W. Ry, 121 N.E. 731 (I11.
375
1914). In Powell v. Board of Education, 97 I11.
Directors, 107 N.E. 327 (I11.
(1881), the Court held that the legislature could properly determine that learning a
foreign language was part of a common school education.
139. 134 N.E. 57 (Ill. 1922).
140. 134 N.E. at 59-61.
1929); People v. Deatherage, 81
141. Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 166 N.E. 504 (I11.
1948).
N.E.2d 581 (I11.
1948).
142. People v. Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581 (I11.
1958).
143. Department of Public Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E. 265 (I11.
144. RECORD, supra note 120, at 232 (1970).
145. See RECORD, supra note 120, at 763-64 (1970). Elliot v. Board of Educ.,
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felt that the term was imprecise and did not want to inhibit legislative
determination that a junior college education or other advanced study
was desirable to meet new needs.' *4 Thus, while the Constitution
mandates that "education in public schools through the secondary
level shall be free," it allows the General Assembly to provide such
other free education as is deemed appropriate.
While the "common school" requirement may have been intended to limit the legislature under the 1870 Constitution, the requirement under the 1870 Constitution that the State provide "a
thorough and efficient system of free schools" was held to be mandatory. 47 However, the courts had an even harder time defining what
was "thorough and efficient" than in defining a "common school
education."
The Illinois Supreme Court held that to meet the requirements
that a school system be "thorough and efficient," the state must be
divided into districts that are sufficiently contigous and compact to
enable children to travel from their homes to school in reasonable
time and with a reasonable degree of comfort. 4 Normally the question of how school districts are drawn is left to the legislature; 49
however, the court has intervened in particularly egregious cases.' 50
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the legislature had no
discretion to deprive any child of the opportunity to receive what the
legislature determined to be a "good common school education."''
A "thorough and efficient" system thus meant that it must be free
152
and open to all equally.
380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. 1978) (recognizing the right of handicapped children to
receive free "special education" classes).
146. ILL. CONST., art. X,

§ 1 (1970).

147. Powell v. Board of Education, 97 Ill. 375, 378 (1881).
148. People v. Young, 133 N.E. 693 (Il1. 1922).
149. Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 166 N.E. 504 (Il. 1929); People v. Deatherage, 81
N.E.2d 581 (11. 1948); People v. Graham, 134 N.E. 57 (Il1.1922); McLain v. Phelps,
100 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1951).
150. People v. Young, 133 N.E. 693 (Ill. 1922) (part of the district, which
extended four miles in length and two miles in width from the main body of the
district, was ten miles from where the school was to be located); People v. Suess,
143 N.E. 462 (Ill. 1924) (condition of roads and character of territory made it difficult
for students to travel conveniently to school); People v. Price, 141 N.E. 409 (Il1.
1923) (bad roads and considerable distances affected accessibility of high schools);
People v. Decatur Unit Sch. Dist., 203 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 1965) (school district included
three islands completely detached from each other).
151. Leighty v. Young, 139 N.E. 894, 895 (Ill. 1923).
152. People v. High School Dist., 71 N.E.2d 86, 89 (11. 1947); People v.
Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ill. 1948); Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 166 N.E. 504, 509
(Ill. 1929).

1991:451

EQUAL EDUCATION

The 1970 Constitution speaks of "an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services." The term "efficient" would appear to carry the meaning it had under the 1870
Constitution. The term "high quality" is informed by paragraph
one's requirement that "all persons be educated to the limits of their
capacities."
C.

THE DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR A "FREE" EDUCATION

The 1970 Illinois Constitution specifically mandates that the State
provide a system of free education through the secondary level. The
General Assembly has discretion to provide such other free education
as it deems appropriate. The State, and not local government, has the
primary responsibility for financing public education.'
The word "free" has been construed by the supreme court to
mean financially free, meaning "no tuition," and to impose on the
54
public the burden of financing education.
A major question which arose under the 1870 Constitution was
whether the State was required to provide students with free textbooks.
In Segar v. Board of Education,'5 5 a board of education required a
deposit to be paid on all textbooks a pupil used. The deposit was to
be refunded if the books were returned in reasonably good condition.
The supreme court upheld the deposit requirement:
A system of schools, which permits all persons of school age
residing in the district to attend classes and receive instruction
in the subjects taught, without a tuition charge, provides free
schools, and the fact that the parents of pupils financially able
to do so are required to provide their children with textbooks,
writing materials, and other supplies required for the personal
use to such pupils does not change the character of the
56
school.1
It was asked during the debates to the 1970 Constitution, whether
the word "free" meant anything beyond free tuition.' 57 The answer
was ambiguous. Delegate William Fogal stated that the word "free"
was to be interpreted as it had been. However, Delegate Anne Evans
stated that school districts could go too far in charging "fees" which
153. ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1920).
154. Aurora East Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Cronin, 442 N.E.2d 511, 515 (11. 1982).
155. 148 N.E. 289 (Ill. 1925).
156. 148 N.E. at 291; accord, Hamer v. Board of Education, 292 N.E.2d 569
(Ill. 1971).
157. RECORD, supra note 120, at 767.
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in effect amounted to tuition 58 Moderate fees for institutional materials were permitted, but if a district charged excessive fees as a
means of getting around the free tuition requirement, this would not
be allowed. She did not explain what she meant by "excessive" but
she did state that a "free education" was both a goal of the State
and a protection to its citizens." 9
D.

THE DUTY OF THE STATE TO FINANCE EDUCATION

The third paragraph of Article X, section 1 of the 1970 Constitution which states that "the State has the primary responsibility for
financing the system of public education," was new. The education
committee's original proposal was more specific. It provided:
To meet the goals of section 1, substantially all funds for the
operational costs of the free public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of the local
school districts. No local governmental unit or school district
may levy taxes or appropriate funds for the purposes of such
educational operation except to the extent of ten percent (10%)
of the amount received by that district from the General
Assembly in that year. 16
Under this proposal local districts would have been free to
continue to control and implement programs, but funds for operational purposes would have come from the State.'61 This proposal was
prompted by concern about the inequality among districts with respect
to their resources from local tax receipts. 62 A dissent to the committee's report agreed that greater state support to decrease inequalities
was required but argued that the proposed constitutional provision
was unwise because it would lead to greater State control and might
lower the overall quality of education.6 3
In presenting the education proposal to the delegates, Delegate
Malcolm Kamin suggested that the paragraph was not merely hortatory but had legal force and effect.1 4 After vigorous debate, the
proposal of the education committee was defeated.' 6'
158.

RECORD,

supra note 120, at 768..

160.
161.
162.
163.

RECORD,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

159. Id.

RECORD,
RECORD,
RECORD,

120,
120,
120,
120,

at
at
at
at

295.
296.
297.
300-04.

164. RECORD, supra note 120, at 3537. In proposing substitute language which
provided in pertinent part that "the State shall provide substantial parity of educa-
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Later in the convention, Delegate Dawn Clark Netsch moved that
language substantially equivalent to that currently in paragraph 3 of
section 1 be adopted.' 66 She conceded that the language was purely
hortatory and did not state a legally enforceable duty.1 67 Delegate
Louis Bottino immediately moved a substitute that he described as
"more than a hortatory statement."16 The Bottino substitution failed,
169
as did the Netsch amendment.
Eighteen days later Delegate Netsch again introduced her amendment and again emphasized that it was not "a legally obligatory
command to the state legislature."' 70 However, Delegate Kamin, in
supporting another substitute that did not pass, questioned whether
the Netsch amendment really was without legal effect and suggested
that it might be used to invalidate local school taxes.' 7 ' After further
debate, the Netsch amendment finally carried.' 7 2
Given these debates, it is not surprising that the Illinois Supreme
Court would reject the contention that paragraph three of Article X,
section 1 required the State to provide not less than 50 percent of the
funds needed to operate the public and elementary school system.' 73
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected a challenge to a reduction
in funding to the Chicago Board of Education because the district
had failed to comply with state minimum term requirements. 7 4 The
court held that the reduction did not violate the State's responsibility
to finance education.' 7 5 Nor did the Court find that the reduction
violated the State's duty to provide an "efficient system of high
quality educational institutions and services" because the requirement
providing high quality,
of a minimum school term was "relevant to
76
1
basis."
state-wide
a
on
education
efficient
tional opportunity," Delegate Louis Bottino also emphasized the enforceability of
the provision in the courts. RECORD, supra note 120, at 3552. The substitute language
of Delegate Bottino was defeated. Id.
165. RECORD, supra note 120, at 3570.
166. RECORD, supra note 120, at 4145.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. RECORD, supra note 120, at 4148.
170. RECORD, supra note 120, at 4500, 4502.
171. RECORD, supra note 120, at 4504. The debates do not make clear why Mr.
Kamin considered this to be so.
172. RECORD, supra note 120, at 4506.
173. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Carey v. Board of Education,
304 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. 1973).
174. Cronin v. Lindberg, 360 N.E.2d 360 (Il1. 1977).
175. 360 N.E.2d at 365.
176. 360 N.E.2d at 365.
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CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that Article X, section 1 guarantees the
right to an equal education in Illinois. This right is derived from the
State's stated goal to educate all persons to the limits of their capacities
and the State's duty to establish "an efficient system of high quality
77
public educational institutions and services.'
The focus on the person in the 1970 Constitution extends the
concept of equality within a school district, as established under the
1870 Constitution, to the equal right of all persons in the State to
178
receive an education.
The State's primary responsibility to fund public education stated
in paragraph three of Article X, section 1171 may well be hortatory, 180
but that provision is distinct from the obligation of the State contained
in paragraphs one and two' to provide all persons with equal
educational opportunities. 8 2 It may be that the legislature has the
discretion to determine the financial formula for bringing that obligation about,' 83 but the courts have the antecedent obligation to insure
that all persons in the State have an equal opportunity to be educated
84
to the limits of their capacities. 1
The judiciary's obligation is not limited to determining whether
individuals in the same district are being treated equally, as was the
case under the 1870 Constitution. Under the 1970 Constitution equality is judged from a statewide perspective. A child in Cairo has the
same right to be educated to the limit of her capacities as a child in
Chicago or in Lake Forest. Assuming there is a correlation between
funding and the quality of education received by individual students,
the Illinois Constitution requires that disparities in funding that
produce unequal educational opportunities be removed. The different
177. ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1970).
178. See, supra, notes 114-132 and accompanying text.
179. ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1970).
180. Seesupra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
181. ILL. CoNsT., art. X, § 1 (1970).
182. See, supra notes 114-52 and accompanying text.
183. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (I11. 1973); Carey v. Board of Education,
304 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. 1973).
184. Cf. Longress v. Board of Educ., 101 Ill.
308 (1882) (right to be free from
racial discrimination); Ashley v. Board of Educ., 114 N.E. 20 (Ill.
1916) (right of
orphans to receive a free education); Elliot v. Board of Education, 380 N.E.2d 1137
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (right of disabled children to receive an equal education); People
v. High Sch. Dist., 71 N.E.2d 86 (Ill.
1947) (schools must be "free and open to all
equally"); Leighty v. Young, 139 N.E. 894 (Ill. 1923) (right of all children to
convenient access to schools).
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language used in the Illinois Constitution, together with the convention
debates and prior Illinois court decisions construing the right to an
equal education, distinguish the situation in Illinois from the United
States Supreme Court decision in San Antonio v. Rodriques, which
held that there is no federal constitutional right to an education.
Rodrigues relied solely on the federal equal protection clause, which
affords only minimal protection when classifications involving nonfundamental rights are based on wealth or disability. 85 Article X,
section 1 of the 1970 Constitution recognizes education as a fundamental right and, therefore, discrimination against those who are
denied an education due to poverty or disability, as well as race,
nationality, gender, and religion, is illegal.
IV.

THE NATURE OF EQUALITY UNDER ARTICLE

I,

SECTION

2

OF THE

ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

Article I, section 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides that
"No person shall . . . be denied equal protection of the laws." Like
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
phrase is broad and inclusive but says little about the nature of
8 6
equality.
Obviously the purpose of all legislation is to classify and make
distinctions. Such classifications and distinctions will normally be
upheld if they are rational.' 8' The courts themselves have given very
little attention, however, as to the nature of the equality that is
protected under either the federal or state constitutions.
185. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (wealth); Cleburne v.
Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental disability).
186. In 1927, Justice Holmes stated that equal protection was "the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927); See also
Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HAav. L. REv. 537 (1982); For an historical
account of the development of the concept of equality in the United States see POLE,
THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AmEscAN HISTORY (1978).
The Illinois Supreme Court has frequently compared the Article 1, section 2
equal protection clause to the prohibition against special legislation in Article IV,
section 13.
The court has stated that special legislation, which confers a special benefit or

exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others
similarly situated, differs from a violation of equal protection, which consists of
arbitrary and invidious discrimination against a person or class of persons. Under

either approach the courts must decide whether the classification is unreasonable in

that it preferentially and arbitrarily includes a class (special legislation) to the exclusion

of all others, or improperly denies a benefit to a class (equal protection). Illinois
Polygraph Soc'y v. Pellicano, 414 N.E.2d 458, 462-63 (Ill. 1980).
187. E.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

The federal constitutional protection of equality is generally
discussed in the context of the scrutiny courts give to various types
of legislative or administrative classifications. If the classification
operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class, such as when lines
are drawn on the basis of race, nationality or sex, or impinges upon
a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the constitution, the courts will strictly scrutinize the classification to determine
if the classification is required by a compelling governmental interest
and if the means used are necessary to achieve that interest. 8 ' If there
is no suspect class or fundamental right involved, the courts will
examine the classification only to determine if it rationally furthers
some legitimate purpose.8 9 If the suspect classification does not appear
on the face of the statute or regulation, it may still violate equal
protection if the "purpose" of the classification was to produce a
discriminatory effect.' 90
While these standards specify how a court is to adjudicate an
equal protection claim, they say very little about what the constitutional guarantee of equality really means. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that, "a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based
on race." 191 But we are also reminded that the clause is not limited
solely to racial discrimination. 192
An insight into what constitutes equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment is provided by Brown v. Board of Education,'93 where
the Supreme Court observed the effects of segregation on AfroAmerican children in holding segregated schools unconstitutional.
However, the Brown focus on the effects of discrimination has been
lost sight of in recent cases. For instance, in PersonnelAdministrator
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, '9 a veteran's preference law had the
effect of excluding women from public employment, but the Court
refused to strike the law, noting that "the Fourteenth Amendment
188. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
189. Id.

190. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
191. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
192. But see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("We
doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision.").
193. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
194. 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
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guarantees equal laws, not equal results." Feeney and similar cases 95
which require a showing of "purposeful" discrimination where the
discrimination is not apparent on the face of the statute make it
difficult to determine what governmentally imposed discrimination is
96

prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Illinois Supreme Court
has set out a framework for equal protection analysis but has not
defined what is meant by an equal education. 97 The Illinois Supreme
Court, like the United States Supreme Court, generally employs a
two-stage analysis to determine whether a legislative classification
deprives individuals of equal protection. When the statute under
consideration affects a fundamental right or discriminates against a
suspect class, Illinois courts are to subject the legislation to strict
scrutiny and uphold it only if it serves a compelling state interest. 98
When the classification does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class, the classification must bear a rational
relationship to a valid legislative purpose and the classifications
created by the statute will be set aside as violative of the equal
protection clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the

pursuit of a legitimate State goal.'9

195. See supra note 190 and the cases cited therein.
196. See Michael P. Seng, "The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation in a

Racial Powder Keg," 61 ORE L. REV. 285, 313-14 (1982).

197. The Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on equal protection is of recent origin
because until the Constitution of 1970, Illinois had no equal protection clause.
Nonetheless, as early as 1882 the Illinois Supreme Court declared that segregated
schools were illegal in Illinois without reference to equal protection. In Longress v.
Board of Educ., 101 Ill.
308 (1882), the court relied upon a legislative enactment
passed to implement art. VIII, § 1, of the 1870 Constitution to hold that a local
school board could not exclude black children from a public school established for
white children. See also Peair v. Board of Educ., 21 N.E. 187 (Ill. 1889); Bibb v.
Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 61 N.E. 1077 (Ill.
1901).
One could argue that because the language of the Illinois Constitution is the
same as the language in the federal Constitution that the two should be construed in
the same manner. See, e.g., Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283,
1290 (Ill. 1991). However, in 1990, the Illinois Supreme Court, noting that the Illinois
Constitution contains its own due process guarantee, held that while the Illinois
courts may look to federal decisions to construe the due process clause, the final
determination remains with the Illinois courts. Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1032
(1990); see also Hartigan v. Kennedy, 576 N.E.2d 107 (Il. App. Ct. 1991). The same
can be said about the equal protection clause.
198. See Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 489 N.E.2d 1374 (Il1. 1986); People
v. Tosch, 501 N.E.2d 1253 (Ill. 1986); Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 489, 493
(1981).
199. Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 489 N.E.2d 1374 (Ill. 1986); People v.
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Because education is considered to be a fundamental right under
Article X of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the courts should strictly
scrutinize the reasons offered by the State to justify why some persons
are receiving an education inferior to that being received by others.
This approach is similar to that used by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Boynton v. Kusper,"°° where the court invalidated a statute that
raised marriage license fees and required county clerks to pass the
increased money on to a fund to provide shelter to victims of domestic
violence. The Court held that the tax singled out marriage as a special
object of taxation and imposed "a direct impediment to the exercise
of the fundamental right to marry." 20 ' The State had failed to
demonstrate a "compelling State interest" to satisfy the strict scrutiny
test.2 02
But again, while this approach offers us a framework for analysis,
it does not tell us what the Illinois Constitution means by the word
"equal" and when the fundamental right to an education is being
provided on an equal basis to all persons. The debates to the 1970
Illinois Constitution concerning Article I, section 2 do not help us in
getting to the roots of what is an equal education in Illinois. °3 A
starting point might be to take a fresh look at the focus of Brown v.
Board of Education2 °4 on the affects of an unequal education. The
Supreme Court went beyond a mere consideration of whether the
physical facilities and other "tangible" factors in the all-black schools
were equal 205 and focused upon the psychological feelings of inferiority
suffered by victims of racial segregation in determining that the right
to an equal education had been violated. 2°6 The end was that black
children as well as white children were to be educated so that they
Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. 1988). The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that
"the application of the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution is limited
to instances of purposeful or invidious discrimination." People v. Anderson, 490
N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ill. 1986). The court has not specifically defined "purposeful"
discrimination, but it defined invidious discrimination as occurring "when government
withholds from a person or class of persons a right, benefit or privilege without a
reasonable basis for the governmental action." Id.
200. 494 N.E.2d 135 (Il. 1986).
201. 494 N.E.2d at 140-41.
202. 494 N.E.2d at 141.
203. In presenting the section to the delegates from the Bill of Rights Committee,
Arthur T. Lennon observed that the clause would clearly announce the concept of

fairness employed in equal protection.
204. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
205. 347 U.S. at 493.
206. 347 U.S. at 494.

RECORD,

supra note 20, at 1499.
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could exercise the public responsibilities of good citizens .207 This was
to be accomplished by "awakening the child to cultural values, [by]
preparing him for later professional training, and [by] helping him to
adjust normally to his environment." 20 8
Equality as defined in Brown would thus be achieved when all
the vestiges of past discrimination had been removed, 2 °9 which seemed
to imply when black children had the same educational opportunity
"to succeed in life" as white children. 210 More recent decisions focus
less on the individual student and more on whether the state is
operating a unitary school system.21 ' However, the Court has stressed
in other recent cases that the focus of an equal protection case must
be upon the individual. 212 Therefore, the courts should not lose sight
of the original focus in Brown on the individual child and should
concentrate on whether the system is providing each child with an
equal opportunity to succeed in life.213
Another useful case for measuring the right to an equal education
is Lau v. Nichols.2 4 Non-English-speaking Chinese students sued San
Francisco school officials claiming that they were denied equal education opportunities because all teaching was done in English and
non-English-speakers were given no special English instruction. The
United States Supreme Court noted that under the California standards, "there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for
students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed
207. 347 U.S. at 493.
208. Id.
209. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
210. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
211. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd, of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spanglor, 427 U.S.
424 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, -U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
212. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
213. The focus on the educational needs of the student was again explicitly
recognized in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Court's holding in San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), does not diminish this
concern under the Illinois Constitution. The Court's federalism concerns in Rodriguez
lead it to deny that education alone was a fundamental right under the federal
Constitution. The Court specifically noted that "no charge fairly could be made that

the [Texas] system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process." 411 U.S. at 37.
214. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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from any meaningful education." 2 '5 The Court held that the Chinesespeaking students received fewer benefits than the English-speaking
majority by being denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in
the educational program. 2 6 The Court did not reach the equal protection argument, 27 but instead relied solely on Section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964218 and the regulations adopted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 2 9 to implement
Section 601 in finding that Chinese students had suffered discrimination. 220 The Lau approach to what is meant by an equal education
under federal regulations should be adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court as the proper approach to determine if the right to an equal
education is being abridged in violation of the Illinois equal protection
clause.
Lau is consistent with the command in Article X, section 1 that
all persons be educated "to the limits of their capacities." Whether
discussing the rights of racial or ethnic minorities, or the rights of
children residing in school districts with a low tax base, or the rights
of mentally, physically, or socially disabled students, the concept of
equal educational opportunity is not an empty vessel. The courts must
215. 414 U.S. at 566.
216. 414 U.S. at 568.
217. The equal protection claim was also avoided in Elliot v. Board of Education,
380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. 1978). The parents of a handicapped student sued the
Chicago Board of Education claiming that the Board was liable to pay for the special
education of handicapped students who had been excluded from the public schools.
They relied upon Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) and
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1971), to establish that the classifications of handicapped students in such
manner as to deny them a free public education violated equal protection. However,
the court held that article X, section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution required the
state to provide a tuition-free education through the secondary level and, therefore,
found it unnecessary to determine the equal protection claim. 380 N.E.2d at 411.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
219. HEW's regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1) (1970), specified that a recipient
could not:
(ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which
is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to
others under the program. .

.

(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or
privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other
benefit under the program.
220. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287
(1978), the Court held that section 601 proscribes only- those racial classifications
that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.
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look to whether the individual student is being given the same
opportunity to succeed in life as other children in the State. This does
not require that all children achieve the same test scores, but it does
require that the system be set up so that each child will be awakened
to cultural values, will be prepared for some later professional training, and will be enabled to adjust normally to his environment.
These goals can be judged objectively with respect to the particular program at issue in each case. If per-pupil expenditures are
unequal in different parts of the state and if as a result of this
inequality students in some districts have less opportunity to be
educated to "the limits of their capacities" than in other districts, the
right to an equal education is violated.
In deciding whether per-pupil expenditures violate equal protection, the Illinois courts can refer to the reapportionment cases that
22
establish the one person/one vote principle. In Reynolds v. Sims, '
the United States Supreme Court recognized that "[d]iluting the
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as
invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic
status." Similarly, diluting a student's education because of place of
residence impairs the student's basic constitutional rights. Although
this principle was repudiated by the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez, that decision rested solely on federal constitution grounds.
The principle applies in Illinois because of the different status accorded education under the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
What the courts state about mathematical equality in voting right
cases is also relevant in determining whether differences in per-pupil
expenditures violate equal protection. In voting cases the courts have
recognized that some deviation from the one person/one vote principle
is permissible. 222 In Gaffney v. Cummings,223 the United States Supreme Court stated:
Fair and effective representation may be destroyed by gross
population variations among districts, but it is apparent that
such representation does not depend solely on mathematical
221. 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (citations omitted).
222. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973), the Supreme Court noted
that, "Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that enable
them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment the exact mathematical formula that establishes what range
of percentage deviations is permissible, and what is not."
223. 412 U.S. 735, 748-49 (1973) (citations omitted).
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equality among district populations. There are other relevant
factors to be taken into account and other important interests
that States may legitimately be mindful of. An unrealistic
overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere nose count
in the districts, may submerge these other considerations and
itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-today operation are important to an acceptable representation
and apportionment arrangement.
In a case involving per-pupil expenditures, the end is equal
educational opportunity. An analysis of per-pupil expenditures is a
starting point in determining equal educational opportunity but mathematical equality is not the sole relevant factor to be considered. Lau
demonstrates that merely providing students with equal educational
materials does not guarantee equal opportunity. For instance, the
drafters of Article X, section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
wanted to guarantee that handicapped students would be provided
with special educational opportunities. Results were important to
them. If inequalities in per-pupil expenditures result in students receiving grossly unequal educational opportunities then the inequalities
must be remedied.
However, the mere fact that expenditures are equal does not
guarantee that handicapped and other disadvantaged students are
receiving equal educational opportunities. Ultimately it is the result
that should determine if the promise of an equal education is being
224
fulfilled in Illinois.
224. Thus, it can be argued that the Bush administration proposals to promote
freedom of choice for students among public and private schools may not be sufficient
to satisfy the demands of Article I, section 2 and Article X, section 1 of the Illinois
Constitution. Freedom of choice would probably be implemented by providing
students with vouchers so they could go to any public or private school they chose.
To the extent that these vouchers would fail to reflect the added costs of educating
handicapped and other disadvantaged students they would fail the Article X, section
1 goal of providing for the "educational development of all persons to the limits of
their capacities."
To the extent that public funds may be used to support education in private
sectarian schools, serious problems arise under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. In this regard the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Article X, section 3, is
even more specific than the First Amendment. It provides that:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school
district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or
sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, con-
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "POLITICAL"
QUESTIONS

AND JUSTICIABLE

The Illinois courts have an obligation to hear cases involving
educational equality, and they should not dismiss such cases on the
ground that they present "political questions." The United States
Supreme Court has regularly decided issues that impact on education, 22 although a number of opinions do recognize that a federal
court's role is not unlimited when it comes to restructuring an
educational system. 226 A number of state courts throughout the country have been asked to determine whether school finance schemes
violate their state constitutions ,227 and many of these courts have
rejected the argument that such issues present non-justiciable political
questions.228
trolled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made
by the State, or any such public operation, to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose.
See generally, Michael P. Seng, "Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, and
Freedom of Religion under the Illinois Constitution, 21 LOYOLA U. Cm. L. J.91,
100-10 (1989).
225. The school desegregation cases offer one of the best casebook examples of
how courts order broad remedial relief against public school systems. E.g., Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
226. Although the Court has generally supported busing within a single school
district, see supra note 225, the Court has expressed reluctance to order interdistrict
remedies. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741, 743 (1974), the Court noted the
deeply rooted tradition of "local control over the operation of schools" and the
"array of other problems in financing and operating this new [consolidated, multidistrict] system." In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973), the Court noted its reluctance to intrude into the area of how the state has
chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues, an area in which the federal
courts have "traditionally deferred to state legislatures." It expressed similar reluctance to impose its views about the goals of public education. Id. at 43.
But see, Missouri v. Jenkins, -U.S.-.,
110 S.Ct. 1651 (1990) (approving a
lower court order imposing an increase in the property taxes to be levied by a school
district to fund a desegregation decree.); Milliken v. Bradley (II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977)
(affirming a lower court decree that required the state to provide a remedial program
in the areas of reading, in-service teacher training, testing and counseling to remedy
the effects of past racial segregation).
227. See supra, notes 106-09.
228. E.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (holding
that a court decree that Kentucky's system of financing education is unconstitutional
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FEDERAL COURTS

The leading case on what constitutes a political question in the
federal courts is Baker v. Car. 229 Justice Brennan's classic opinion
clearly distinguishes political questions from political cases. 230 The
opinion bases the political question doctrine on separation of powers
and notes that it is the responsibility of the Court to decide "whether
a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
'23
exceeds whatever authority has been committed." '

The reapportionment claim presented in Baker v. Carr was
grounded on the equal protection clause. Justice Brennan correctly
noted that challenges on the basis of a constitutional deprivation of
232
individual rights presents the classic justiciable question.
Once a case is found to present a justiciable case or controversy
the federal courts cannot decline to hear the matter. 233 The federal
courts have carved out a narrow group of cases which they can abstain
from hearing on policy grounds, but the rationale for the abstention
doctrine is grounded in federal- state relations and not in separation
23 4
of powers concerns as was the case in Baker v. Carr.
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the Kentucky Constitution);
Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirley, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (rejecting contention
that school funding issues present a "political question"); Washakie Co. Sch. Dist.

No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 318 (Wyo. 1980) ("This is no more a political
question than any other challenge to the constitutionality of statutes."); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981) ("Judicial review of legislative enactments
is central to our system of constitutional government and deeply rooted in our
history."); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 (Wash. 1978) ("Once
it has been determined that the court has the power or the duty to construe or
interpret words or phrases in the constitution and to give them meaning and effect
by construction, it becomes a judicial issue rather than a matter to be left to legislative
discretion"); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 375 (Conn. 1977) (court can decide
question whether state has discharged its duty to educate its children, but court
should stay its hand to give legislature a chance to fashion an appropriate remedy).
229. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
230. Id. at 209 ("The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right
does not mean it represents a political question.").
231. Id.at 211.
232. Id.at 229.
233. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, (1821) ("We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given.").
234. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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Difficult cases are sometimes avoided by resorting to the discre-

tion traditionally available to chancellors in equity. A good example
is O'Shea v. Littleton,235 where the Supreme Court was faced with the
question whether civil rights plaintiffs could sue state trial judges for
equitable relief on the ground that the judges had engaged in racial

discrimination when they set bonds and imposed sentences in criminal
cases. However, the Court again cited federalism concerns to avoid
the issue:

[Riecognition of the need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of state courts counsels restraint against the
issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the
administration of the state's criminal laws in the absence of a
showing of irreparable injury which is 'both great and immediate. '236
The policy reasons behind those restraints that are grounded on

federalism have no relevance to the question whether a state court

should enjoin state school officials from denying children an equal

education. The concern is rather one of separation of powers as
defined by state law.
B.

ILLINOIS COURTS

Many of the early "political question" cases in Illinois turned on
the archaic reasoning that a court of equity would not protect
"political" as distinguished from "civil" rights. 2 7 Other cases were
more properly termed "political" because they presented issues that
had been committed exclusively to another branch of the govern-

ment .238

235. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
236. Id. at 499. The Court recognized that resort to the criminal laws could be
used to punish errant judges. Also, defendants could move for a substitution of
judge, a change of venue, or they could seek review by direct appeal or post
conviction collateral appeal. Id. at 502-03.
237. Fletcher v. Tuttle, 37 N.E. 683 (Ill. 1894) (right to vote); see also Malkin
v. City of Chicago, 127 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (the right to hold a public
office); Daly v. Madison County, 38 N.E.2d 160 (I1. 1941); Fletcher v. City of Paris,
35 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1941) (the right not to have public funds spent for an unlawful
use); People v. McWeeney, 102 N.E. 233 (Il. 1913) (the right to organize a political
convention). These cases were all found to involve "political rights" so that a court
of equity could not intervene to protect them by injunction.
238. See, e.g., Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 102 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1951) (the
determination of when a war is terminated rests with Congress or the President and
not with the courts); Village of Hyde Park v. Oakwoods Cemetery Ass'n, 7 N.E.2d
627 (Ill. 1886) (The determination of what is a public benefit for eminent domain
purposes belongs exclusively to the legislature.).
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More recent Illinois decisions follow Baker v. Carr239 and ground
the "political question" doctrine on separation of powers concerns.2
The leading Illinois case is Rock v. Thompson.2 41 State senators
petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Governor to convene
the Senate so it could elect a presiding officer and for an injunction

to restrain another senator from assuming the office of President of

the Senate. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the suit presented
the narrow question whether the Governor had complied with the
constitution, and found that the doctrine of separation of powers did

not prevent "the court from ascertaining compliance with or mandating performance of constitutional duties. ' 242 The court emphasized
"it is the duty of the judiciary to construe the constitution and

determine whether its provisions have been disregarded by the actions
2 43
of any of the branches of government.
The "political question" defense has generally not been a major
issue in most Illinois cases involving the right to an education. The

doctrine clearly does not apply when individual students claim a

violation of their rights by school authorities. Thus, the Illinois courts
have adjudicated claims involving racial segregation, 244 claims about
school prayer,2 45 claims that public funds are used to finance religious

that the state is failing to meet the needs of
education, 24 6 and claims
247
handicapped students.

The courts have applied the "political question" defense in a

series of cases involving the power of the legislature to determine the
239. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
240. Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a statute
providing a method for filling vacancies to the General Assembly was not unconstitutional); Rote v. Washington, 500 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (court could
properly decide whether city council acted in accord with its rules); Murphy v.
Collins, 312 N.E.2d 772 (II1. App. Ct. 1974) (court can consider whether a legislative
investigation can be delegated to a committee).
241. 426 N.E.2d 891 (111. 1981).
242. 426 N.E.2d at 896.
243. Id. (quoting Harrod v. Illinois Court Comm'n, 372 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1973)).
244. Longress v. Board of Education, 101 I11. 308 (1882); Peair v. Board of
Educ., 21 N.E. 187 (111. 1889); People ex rel. Bibb v. Mayor and Common Council
of Alton, 61 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1901).
245. Ring v. Board of Education, 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910).
246. Dunn v. Chicago Indust. Sch. for Girls, 117 N.E. 735 (I11.1917); Board of
Educ. v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. 1973); Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129
(I11. 1973).
247. Department of Public Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265 (II1. 1958); Pierce
v. Board of Educ., 370 N.E.2d 535 (II1. 1977); Elliot v. Board of Educ., 380 N.E.2d
1137 (111.App. Ct. 1978).
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boundaries of school districts. 248 A major question in these cases has
been the meaning of the words "a thorough and efficient system of
free schools, whereby all children of this State may receive a good
common school education" found in Article VIII, section 1 of the
249
1870 Illinois Constitution.
In People ex. rel. Leighty v. Young, 250 Justice Cartwright articulated what is and is not justiciable under that clause. He noted that
the legislature has discretion to determine what shall constitute a good
common school education because there is not, and was not at the
adoption of the constitution, any accepted definition of that term.
However, he held that the legislature had no discretion to provide a
system which deprives any children of the State of the opportunity to
obtain a good common school education.
What Justice Cartwright said about Article VIII, section 1 of the
1870 Constitution is directly applicable to Article X, section 1 of the
1970 Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the
question whether Article X, section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution, which reads that, "The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education," requires the State
to provide not less than 50% of the funds needed to operate and
251
maintain public elementary and secondary schools is justiciable.
Justice Schaefer stated for the court:
It is suggested that the cases do not present a justiciable
question, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the issue
presented is a 'political' one, and also that the actions should
not have been entertained because 'specific relief through a
decree of conclusive character' was not requested. It is apparent, however, that the controversy is real and that the substantial interests involved are practical and financial, rather
248. People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 139 N.E. 894 (Ill. 1923); People v.
Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. 1948); People ex rel. McLain v. Gardner, 96 N.E.2d
551 (I1. 1951).
249. The language of the 1970 Illinois Constitution is more specific:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development
of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through
the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as
the General Assembly provides by law.
ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1970).
250. 139 N.E. 894, 896-97 (Ill. 1923).
251. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973).
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than 'political.' The claim of the plaintiffs is that the 1970
constitution requires that a portion of the burden of financing
the State's educational system be shifted from one group of
taxpayers to another. Contrary positions are asserted on the
one hand by the property taxpayers, and on the other by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction represented by the Attorney General. The relief prayed in both complaints is a declaration of the invalidity of those provisions of the School Code
which relate to the furnishing of State funds to local school
districts. We therefore conclude that the controversy is a
justiciable one, of which the court had jurisdiction."'
The court held on the merits that the section did not impose a specific
2a
obligation on the General Assembly, but rather stated a goal.
These holdings strike the right balance between political and
justiciable questions. It is the function of the courts to interpret the
words of the constitution to determine if they impose specific obligations on the other branches of government and, if they do, to give
them effect. 2 4 The 1970 Illinois Constitution placed a more specific
obligation on the State to provide all children with an education than
had been the case previously. That all persons are to be educated to
the limits of their capacities is stated as a goal, and this goal is to be
effectuated by the specific requirement that, "The State shall provide
for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions
and services. '255 As Justice Cartwright articulated in construing the
1870 Constitution, this does not mean that courts are to decide what
is a proper curriculum, but it does mean that the essential question
whether the education being provided by the state allows all children
an equal opportunity to develop to the limits of their capabilities is
clearly justiciable.256
VI.

CONCLUSION

The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended to make
the principle embodied in Brown v. Board of Education that all
children be educated to the limits of their capacities a primary goal

252.
253.
254.
255.
Board of
256.

Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 100.
1981).
Rock v. Thompson, 426 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ill.
ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (1970) (emphasis added); See Elliot v.
App. Ct. 1978).
Educ., 380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill.
1923).
Leighty v. Young, 139 N.E. 894, 896-97 (Ill.
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in Illinois. 257 They established a right to an education and further
provided that this right must be equally available to all children. The
enforcement of this right is not left to the sole discretion of the
legislature. It is a right granted to each and every child in Illinois
regardless of the school district where the child happens to be placed.
The Illinois courts have a strong tradition in enforcing the right to an
equal education. This tradition is consistent with the principle that
the essence of American constitutionalism is that the courts provide
25
a remedy when a person's rights are violated. 1
The issue of current interest in Illinois is whether the disparity of
funding between school districts is unconstitutional. As interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, the United States Constitution
probably does not supply a remedy. However, the emphasis placed in
the Illinois Constitution on the equal education of all persons does.
If students in Cairo or Chicago do not have the same opportunity to
"educational development to the limits of their capacities" as students
in other parts of the State, the State has the duty under the Illinois
Constitution to correct that disparity. If the disparity is caused by
unequal funding, the Illinois legislature has an obligation to devise a
plan that will remedy the problem. If the legislature fails to act, the
courts may order it to do so.
While the Illinois Supreme Court has had few opportunities to
interpret and enforce Article X of the 1970 Constitution, we believe
that the court will take an activistic approach in reviewing state
legislation to determine if individuals are being denied their right to
an equal education. Given the court's long history of support for the
right to an equal education and the growing trend in this State and
others, in support of the enforcement of provisions of state constitutions, this conclusion is clearly warranted. In this era of declining
involvement of the United States Supreme Court on issues which it
257. In introducing the education article, ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1
(1970), Delegate Patch commented:
No longer can educational development be for a certain people or a particular
section of our society. We cannot close our eyes to the perceptional and
exceptional child; the mentally or physically handicapped or the gifted; the
under-privileged; the oppressed. No, we have realized on our committeeand we hope that you will realize-that they, too, are human beings with
the same rights as everyone else. We, the people, the state, society can no
longer hide from the fact that thousands and thousands and thousands of
youngsters in our community are not being developed to the fullest of their
capacity.
RECORD, supra note 120, at 763-64 (1970).
258. See ILL. CONST., art. I, § 12 (1970).
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believes are best handled at the state or local level, state courts must
show a greater commitment to enforcing the right of individuals to
an equal education. Based on the broad powers and remedies available
to the Illinois Supreme Court, we believe that the court will not shrink
from its responsibility to enforce the right of all persons to an equal
education.

